It is almost a year since Iran detained my friends Shane Bauer and Sarah Shourd (and their friend Josh).

It demonstrates just how empty the Iranian government’s claim to defend Palestinian rights really is.

Shane and Sarah – who were living in Yarmouk, a Palestinian refugee camp at the time – have done more for Palestinians and against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that pretty much every Arab and Iranian I know.

What is depressing is that the Iranians must know this, and yet still detain them.

Part of the blame must also lie with the official “Free The Hikers” campaign, that for whatever reasons has chosen not to highlight Sarah and Shane’s politics. Despite doing fantastic work in drumming up domestic US support, it has taken too long to start trickling in information about their work.

Portraying them as hikers lost in the wrong part of the Middle East does not help anyone understand who they are. When I first saw the story in The Times last year, I instantly assumed they were spies. Who wouldn’t?

However, that same afternoon I got a call from a friend in Syria who said it was Shane and Sarah. After my initial panic I thought that as soon as it became clear to the public who these guys were they would be released.

But nobody was talking about their work. I’m still not sure why, but their families wanted to take their politics out of the equation. Unfortunately when it comes to the Middle East that doesn’t work. Politics is paramount and people fall on either side of the line: pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli. Sure, there are more nuanced ways of saying it, but that’s the fundamental distinction. If you’re American and don’t have the evidence to prove it, the assumption is you’re of the latter category. Fair enough, I say, Americans (and Brits) have done enough to shaft the Middle East many times over to warrant immediate suspicion.

The difference was that in this case, there was – and still is – the evidence to demonstrate very clearly that these guys are not US/Israeli spies and have spent their lives campaigning for justice in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and many other places besides.

It has been a frustrating year for many of Sarah and Shane’s friends (well, at least the ones that I know) who have felt that they haven’t been able to talk about their politics for fear of jeopardising the official campaign. However, following a visit by the mothers of Sarah, Shane and Josh to Iran in May, Shane asked explicitly that we focus on their work for justice in the Middle East.

So that’s what we’re doing now. Along with a bunch of their friends, we’ve released a website with quotes and links to their work. Please visit it and pass it on.

Iran needs to realise that if it really cares about the rights of Palestinians it should release Shane, Sarah and Josh.

www.FreeOurFriends.eu

I’ve been in Syria for the past six weeks so haven’t been reading the Guardian (or writing on this blog).

However, I just came across a May 22nd copy of the Guardian on Indymedia, which to be frank, was shocking.

The headline of the article reads: Iran’s secret plan for summer offensive to force US out of Iraq.

At this point, you might think: interesting story. However, at the end of the first paragraph, Simon Tisdall reveals his sources, writing “US officials say”.

Wow. How terrible is that journalism? The headline is not even in quotation marks. You don’t have to be a conspiracy theorist to understand the skewed interests of ‘US officials’ and the likelihood of media manipulation.

Imagine if the Guardian broke a ‘story’ on its front page about US plans to carpet bomb Damascus, only to find out further down that their source was Iranian officials.

I must say I’m quite disappointed because I generally read the Guardian, although the Independent does have better Middle East coverage.

***
ps went to the Iranian Cultural Institute in Damascus the other day and was invited to a recital of Khomeini’s poetry. Would have been comedy. Happy 100th birthday AK.

A student at Amir Kabir University in Tehran holds up a piece of paper during a visit by President Ahmadinejad that says: “Fascist president, the Polytechnic is not your place”

Fingerprinting my Taser

In November 2006, the Majles (parliament) passed a bill requiring all US visitors to Iran to be fingerprinted on entry.

It was a controversial bill, not likely to pass at all. Ahmadinejad and his government opposed it, as did many members of the Majles.

However, when footage taken on a mobile phone of an Iranian student being tasered by police at UCLA in California was released on the internet, it didn’t take long for Iranians to disseminate it to the community outside and inside Iran. The attack was denounced in the Iranian media and debated in parliament.

On November 19, over two-hundred Majles deputies condemned the beating of the Iranian student. On the same day they passed the US fingerprinting bill – despite the government’s objections.

The irony of the incident is that the student, Mostafa Tabatabainejad, is Baha’i, a persecuted minority in the Islamic Republic.

Still, it does strike me as quite crazy that a mobile phone video in LA can affect parliamentary proceedings in Tehran.

See the film below:

“Death to the Dictator”

In December, Ahmadinejad addressed students at Amir Kabir University in Tehran, where he was confronted by angry protests.

Although the hall where he gave his televised speech was largely packed-out with the government’s Basij faithful, there was a group of students at the back of the hall who burned pictures of Ahmadinejad and chanted “death to the dictator”.

Pro-government media has tried to say that the dissenting group was a tiny minority of the student body. However, in a repressive state where the price of protest is high, such demonstrations are taken seriously by everyone.

I like the way Ahmadinejad’s response was similar to what Blair says every time he’s confronted with a protest:

“I am not surprised, because there is such a free atmosphere in the university environment that these incidents can happen.”

As the students later wrote in an open letter, December 12 2006 will be remembered as “a day in which the university loudly proclaimed that it was alive”

Official TV footage:

Mobile video from the back of the hall:

Demonstration outside the gates (chanting “death to the dictator”):

Dirty Dancing

Finally, on a more humorous note, a Vice-President of Iran, Rahim Moshai, has been busted for watching women sing and dance.

On a visit to Turkey to an Organisation of the Islamic Conference event, he was invited to watch a display of dancing which included women with their hair uncovered.

While this wouldn’t be a problem is most other parts of the world, Rahim Moshai’s government is responsible for forcing men and women to celebrate separately at events such as weddings, lest the men catch a racy glimpse of a dancing lady, or indeed hear her sing.

So when a video of the incident hit the internet it sparked outrage in parts of the Iranian media and even precipitated calls for Rahim Moshai’s resignation. The Iran News website, which originally posted the video, had its managing director detained and its site blocked.

Mr Vice-President, shame on your loose morals!

See extremely explicit video below:

Here’s him arriving at the conference

And here’s the “unislamic” dancing

The Assembly of Experts is important for one reason: it selects the Supreme Leader, for life, from among its members.

This election won’t be very interesting, since competition has been eliminated by the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council (the un-elected 12-member supreme legislative body).

Public participation in the ballot has historically been very low – last time under 10%. With the decision to hold both this election and the local council elections concurrently, the government hopes to boost voter-turnout.

The local council election is different. Those elected have access to real money, and in the case of the Tehran City Council, significant amounts of it.

It should be remembered that Ahmadinejad and friends emerged onto the political scene in 2003 after winning the Tehran municipal elections. It was from that influential position that Ahmadinejad launched his successful bid for the presidency in 2005.

The Political Landscape

Political parties and groups abound in Iran, and trying to understand them can be a real headache.

It’s easier to think of politics in Iran in terms of movements and personalities. Parties have very little grassroots support and therefore tell us little .

The two main movements or political camps in Iran are the Conservatives (part of who now refer to themselves as Principlists) and the Reformists.

The divide, ultimately, is about democratic representation in Iranian politics. The Reformists want more – through greater parliamentary power and a freer press, while the Conservatives fear that these things will lead to greater foreign influence in Iran and the dissolution of the ideals of the Revolution.

Politicians may also have other priorities, such as an inclination towards free-market economic models or support for social conservatism. However, there is no doubt that this overriding division – between Reformists and Conservatives – has shaped Iranian politics for the past decade.

1997 and the Reformists

Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s only Reformist president, was elected by a landslide in 1997. Despite short-term successes by the Reformists in liberalising the media and attempting to engage internationally, the Conservative elements in the regime, in particular the Supreme Leader Khamanei and the Guardian Council, blocked many of the reforms.

As the popular frustration at the lack of progress on reform combined with a perceived weakness in Khatami to really push for change, Reformists and the voters who supported them became disaffected with the political process.

July 1999 saw the largest public unrest since the Revolution, as thousands of students demonstrated for democratic reform. Following days of instability and tension, Khatami was under pressure from both the students pushing for democratisation and the regime’s Conservatives who threatened radical counter-measures to crush the dissent. Khatami’s ultimate decision to appeal for calm and stand against the students – who had been among his strongest supporters – was seen by many as a betrayal.

Khatami was re-elected in 2001 with a diminished mandate. The Reformists continued to shed supporters, as voters blamed them for their inability to push for real change. Khatami claimed that his hands were tied by the Conservative establishment; his critics charged that he could have done more, using his unique position as President.

Either way, the Reform movement was on its last legs in 2003 when many voters didn’t bother to turn up to the local elections and Ahmadinejad and his ideological allies were voted into the Tehran City Council. These Conservatives went on to make large gains in the parliamentary election a year later, and win the presidential election a year after that.

Ahmadinejad and the Principlists

The 2005 Presidential election marked the formal end to the Reformist administration.

Iran today is under the administration of a new political grouping. This branch of the Conservative movement, which count Ahmadinejad among their number, are young, radical and pious.

Referring to themselves as “Principlists”, in reference to their adherence to the ideals of both Islam and the Revolution, they see many problems in today’s Iran. However, their prescription for these ailments is a return to Revolutionary principles, not a reform away from them, as Khatami and the Reformists were advocating.

Ahmadinejad and his allies comprise what could be referred to as the ‘foot soldiers’ of the Revolution. Veterans of the Basij (the government’s youth militia) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the elite ideological wing of the military), these Principlists spent much of their adult life fighting in the Iran-Iraq war. They have invested a great deal in the “success” of the Revolution.

What makes these Principlists fundamentally different to other Conservatives is the class dimension of their discourse. Principlists in general are not members of the clerical establishment – Ahmadinejad was the first non-cleric to become President – rather they hail from the religious working class.

Although foreign media emphasise the elements of Ahmadinejad’s speeches that refer to Israel or the Iranian nuclear programme, it is his economic agenda that makes him popular among certain parts of Iranian society.

Ahmadinejad’s electoral pledge to “bring the oil revenue to the people’s tables” is not only a promise to the rural poor that they have not been forgotten; it is a promise to address the corruption responsible for Iran’s squandered natural resources. The Principlists are well aware that this corruption extends to parts of the traditional Conservative establishment.

So while the Principlists’ adherence to the ideals of the Revolution and the absolute rule of the Supreme Leader puts them at odds with the Reformists, it is their revulsion of economic corruption that pits them against members of their own Conservative movement.

Rafsanjani: a dangerous enemy to have

Nowhere is this loathing stronger than towards Rafsanjani, whom Principlists see as the epitome of clerical excess and corruption.

Rafsanjani’s wealth is a source of much political discussion in Iran, and in many shared taxis or bread queues you can hear people talking about his dubious wealth.

Whether any of it is true is hard to say in the opaque Iranian economic system; however, it is hard to find any Iranian who is not convinced of Rafsanjani’s shady millions (or indeed billions).

A former president of Iran (1989-1997), Rafsanjani is the current deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the head of the powerful Expediency Council, a body that both mediates between the Guardian Council and Parliament and also advises the Supreme Leader. He is close to the current Supreme Leader Khamanei and was a trusted aide to Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, who appointed him commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the last year of the Iran-Iraq war. Many observers believe he is a strong candidate to succeed Khamanei as the Supreme Leader.

In short, Rafsanjani is an extremely powerful man.

As such, these hostile Principlist sentiments would have meant little to Rafsanjani before August 2005. However, when Ahmadinejad defeated him in a head-to-head runoff to become president, the animosity could no longer be ignored. The humiliation of losing to the little-known Tehran Mayor in his shabby coat must have shaken this political behemoth.

Over the past year, signs of this rivalry between the Principlists and Rafsanjani have become increasingly apparent. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazi, the arch-fundamentalist cleric who is seen as the ideological mentor to Ahmadinejad and his allies, has been making his hostility known to Rafsanjani.

In June, at a major speech in Qom, the heartland of the country’s clergy, Rafsanjani was heckled by Mesbah-Yazdi’s students, who accused him of being an “appeaser” and a “counter-revolutionary”. Rafsanjani, visibly shocked by this public affront by protesters in clerical robes, ended his televised speech early and cancelled subsequent appearances and interviews.

This animosity towards Rafsanjani was further confirmed when an electoral list for the Assembly of Experts was released under the name of “the friends of Mesbah-Yazdi” which did not include Rafsanjani or his powerful ally Rohani among their candidates. Both these personalities are on the Conservative and Reformist lists, which is more evidence of the Principlists separating themselves from the main Conservative bloc.

Finally, and most relevant to the upcoming election this Friday, Principlists stand divided in the Tehran City Council elections, once again because of Rafsanjani.

The current Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf, who considers himself a Principlist, has been shunned by the more extreme elements of the group who criticise him, among other things, for appointing Rafsanjani’s son as Manager of the Tehran Metro. This division among the Principlists leaves them vulnerable ahead of the local elections and has dominated the Iranian media in the run-up to Friday’s ballot.

Reformists court their new friend?

Ever since Rafsanjani’s public humiliation in Qom, Reformists have been adapting to the possibility of adopting this new enemy of the Principlists, or the extreme Conservatives, as one of their own.

Seen until very recently as a regime stalwart and a Conservative, Rafsanjani has been an awkward ally for some Reformists.

However, Reformists are using defence of Rafsanjani as a means to attack their Principlist enemies. By criticising Rafsanjani’s critics, Reformists are able to vent their frustration with the current administration while hiding behind Rafsanjani’s position.

The pro-government press finds it harder to attack the Reformists if it means criticising Rafsanjani in the process. It is still a dangerous game for anyone to attack the powerful man publicly.

Rafsanjani’s conversion to a Reformist figure is still very much in process. However, his endorsement of the Reformist coalition in the local elections is a major step in that direction.

What this means for Iranian politics is still hard to say; however, this rift between the Principlists and traditional Conservatives, including Rafsanjani, could shape Iranian politics for years to come.

Unity, Disunity and Friday’s Election

The Reformists, unlike the Principlists, have achieved unity for the first time in years, with all the Reformist groups running a joint list. The minor exception is Karrubi, the former parliamentary speaker, who while technically running a separate list for his National Trust Party, has been persuaded by Khatami to list identical candidates to the official Reformist Coalition.

Faced with this unprecedented Reformist unity, the Principlist bickering could damage both their – and Ahmadinejad’s – standing in government. A significant defeat in Friday’s election would dent the popular support that Ahmadinejad has been claiming since the 2005 presidential election.

However, this prediction relies on one unpredictable variable: voter turnout.

If Iranians choose to boycott the ballot-box, something they have been doing increasingly since Khatami’s first election in 1997, then the Principlists can expect to win again.

If Iranians decide that these elections do provide a worthwhile opportunity for change, however slight, then they may vote in larger numbers, almost certainly for the Reformists.

So, in summary, what to look out for (in order of interest):

• Who wins the Tehran City Council?
• What is the voter turnout?
• What are the relative Reformist/Principlist gains?
• What the various individuals and groups say in the heat of the election, and
• What is the position of the various groups on the results?

While the Western media seems preoccupied with Tehran’s “Holocaust Conference” – which garners little interest among people in Iran – if you want to know what’s happening in the generally opaque world of Iranian politics, Friday will provide a rare opportunity to find out.

**

I appreciate this article is going to be a oversimplification for some, since Iranian politics is not exactly straightforward. However, I was trying to explain to those with little knowledge of Iranian politics that there is movement beneath Iran’s authoritarian veneer. There are forces for change, even if all the actors look disturbingly similar to the foreign eye. Go ahead and ask any questions and I’ll try and answer them. I’m no expert, but with the depressingly low level of public knowledge about the politics of such a “high priority” country, I think that anything can help.

In the past week, Mohammad Khatami and Jack Straw have both called for British citizens to prioritise their ‘Britishness’. Halfiranian asks why.

Last Wednesday night, I went to hear the ex-president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, give a talk entitled ‘Tolerance, Moderation and the Dialogue of Civilizations’.

I wasn’t that interested in the subject of his talk, I was more excited to see what kind of man Khatami really is. Unlike the demonstrators outside Chatham House, who see him as just another mullah in a theocracy with blood and torture on its hands, I left the discussion with a positive impression of the guy.

Sure, I think he’s a spineless bureaucrat for never once putting his career – let alone life – on the line for the reformist movement while in power. But at the same time, after seeing him talk, at least now I’m convinced he stands in the right place. He does believe in genuine peaceful reform, even if he doesn’t have the balls to really push for it.

I’m babbling slightly though. What really struck me about his talk was his statement about British identity. In a reply to a question from a World Service reporter about the veil (yawn) in the UK, Khatami addressed Muslims in Britain, saying: “don’t think you are Muslim; you are British first of all”.

I must say, it did surprise me to hear that from a representative of the Islamic Republic. However, perhaps it was naive of me to expect any state leader (past or present) to promote the primacy of anything other than a state identity.

The next day, Thursday, Jack Straw made similar statements about identity at an “inter-faith conference” at UCL. Straw was concerned that people had come to see themselves “more in terms of their cultural, ethnic, national, gender or religious affiliations”, the BBC quoted him as saying.

He went on to say that “Britishness” could provide “common values”, such as liberty, tolerance and the rule of law, adding that a “stronger sense of shared British identity” was needed.

But why?

Why do Khatami and Straw say that we need to be more British? Straw implies that it’s to compensate for the “erosion of [a] collective sense of community”, resulting from our diminished “sense of class” over the past 50 years (is that not a good thing?).

But is promoting “Britishness” really the best we can do? Surely, we have to think about what our common identities are first, and then create political institutions to accommodate them – not the other way round.

What is it – if anything – that unifies British citizens under one identity? Was this identity changed by the inclusion of Northern Ireland into the mix a couple of hundred years ago? What if we chopped off Wales (only joking), or added Brittany?

Next time someone talks about “Britishness”, think really hard about what they’re talking about. Better still, ask them to define it. See if they can do better than the hopeless job by the Telegraph.

Tell me if I’m being excessively cynical, but to me “Britishness” is nothing more than a political identity (same as Iranian-ness). Straw himself admits that it’s not a national identity, saying “there are Scottish, English and Welsh nations” (in the same way as there are Kurdish, Baluch and Persian nations – to name but a few – in Iran).

By trying to define (and enforce) Britishness, we are desperately seeking to explain a system where “we” as Britons are treated differently to foreigners. We need to define our differences from non-British citizens, otherwise the justification for preferential treatment disappears.

If we didn’t do that – i.e. consider ourselves different to foreigners – things would start to go awry. We might start caring as much about the Iraqi victims of violence as we do about the July 7th bombing victims in “our own” London. We might start being concerned as much for children with HIV in Africa as we do for those in the North-East of England.

Neglecting a state identity risks exposing a huge lie about the way we all live our comfortable lives.

Without Britishness, we wouldn’t be talking about “turkey twizzlers” in UK schools, but about the 100 million children who don’t go to school.

Without Britishness, we wouldn’t be moaning about NHS waiting-lists, but doing something about the 10 million children who die of preventable diseases every year.

Without Britishness, we wouldn’t be questioning Romania’s right to join the EU, but questioning our ‘right’ to a veto in the Security Council.

Without Britishness, we would have no reason to have passports which provide us access to places where others cannot go.

Without Britishness, we wouldn’t tolerate locking people up and deporting them simply because they want to share our opportunities.

Without Britishness, if a foreigner could do your job better than you, what argument would you use to stop her?

Without Britishness, we are forced to see our country for what it is. A racist club designed to maintain our arbitrary privileges.

That is why we need Britishness. Because without it, we are reduced to humans. And nobody seems to want that.

Karimi,

I am sorry, but I boycott anything that comes from any nation that fosters terrorism, contempt for human life and freedom, and lack of courtesy to your men and women. Why? If you really want to know, read on:

My country is culturally Christian (mainly), yours is namely [sic] Muslim. This doesn’t bother me- Why does it bother Iran? Or Iraq?? Or whoever?!? Why is this a problem?

Also; Why develop nuclear weapons? We are in the process of disarming, whereas your country, along with Korea and others, is doing the opposite. This means we will be re-arming. And strengthening our military- and improving on ways to defend (this means “kill people”); your government (and others) are inevitably forcing our hand. The “people” of America, and Britain, and others, DO NOT want a war- not because we are afraid we may not win it, but because we do not want it. We would rather live with men than kill them.

You (and your people) need to get involved and tell your government about the message of peace. Use you festival forum for that message! Otherwise, you can forget Animation festivals, as well as the whole Muslim/Christian – Jihad/Crusade struggle: we will be a dead planet. And that is not what Christ or Muhammad, or God himself commanded. Not even close.

Salaam alekum

What an ungrateful idiot.

The really unsettling fact, however, is how much this American has clearly lapped-up all of Bush’s propaganda on Iran and reproduced it faithfully and unquestioningly. Evidently, he thinks that the country is populated by 70 million christian-and-jew-hating-suicidal-jihadists.

He genuinely believes that Iran’s nuclear programme is “forcing [America's] hand” in re-arming. Wait a minute, when did the US (or Britain for that matter) even start disarming? They didn’t. And this sentence: “We would rather live with men than kill them” – how magnanimous!

What worries me even more is the opening section where he asks why “Iran, Iraq, or whoever” has a problem with the US being predominantly Christian. When has this been an issue for any of these countries? When has this been a problem?

Clearly, this guy thinks that any resistance to US policy in the Middle East is simply because Americans are Christians, nothing to do with illegal wars or prolongued occupations. How many Americans agree with this guy? I have no idea, but probably enough to make me very uncomfortable.

Once I’d stopped yelling at my monitor, I realised that this American’s email made me very sad. Being an artist in Iran is tough. Not only is the money bad – as it is everywhere – but there’s a constant struggle with the authorities for freedom-of-expression. I would have thought that any genuine foreign artist would stand alongside their Iranian counterparts, not send them abusive responses to their invitations.

**

PS. This isn’t really to do with this letter particularly, but just need to vent this little gripe. That phrase, “contempt for human life”, gets banded about by Bush and Blair (and the nob who wrote this letter) whenever they talk about “terrorism”. If Osama bin-Laden or Zarqawi or Zawahiri or any of these other nutters had “contempt for human life” then they would have killed themselves. It would be much more accurate to say they have “contempt for your life”, but that may prompt you to shift uncomfortably in your seat and begin to ask why. And we wouldn’t want that.

**

For those who missed the BBC documentary, the thesis went something like this: Israel’s precedent of pre-emptively bombing Iraq’s nuclear reactor in the 80′s, combined with its perception of an existential threat in Iranian president Ahmadinejad, lead to a relatively straightforward conclusion – Israel will not let Iran get a bomb.

The problem with this logic is that there is no existential threat from Iran.

Who runs Iran?

To understand the danger Iran poses to Israel, it’s self-evident that we need to know who the Iranian decision-makers are. As the documentary clearly points out, “Israel has been watching Iran closely since the 1979 revolution”. Israeli politicians are well aware that Ahmadinejad would never have his finger on any red button, were Iran to develop a nuclear bomb. Any military decisions are taken by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is certainly no hot-headed newcomer to power.

Khamenei has been supreme leader for over 15 years – following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 – so why is all the attention being paid to President Ahmadinejad? Besides, the Western media has just spent the past eight years excusing former President Khatami’s inability to reform Iran by saying the position of president is an impotent one.

Watching Tuesday’s documentary, anyone would have thought Ahmadinejad has the power to attack Israel – he doesn’t. The president of Iran is not the most powerful man in the country. He’s not even the second or third most powerful man in the regime. So don’t look at Ahmadinejad when assessing the Iranian ‘threat’.

The Israelis are more than ready to forget these minor details when discussing Iran with the media. Besides, their interest is to garner international support against Iran, and Ahmadinejad’s headline-friendly sensationalist rhetoric is the just what they need.

Khamenei’s position

If it doesn’t really matter what Ahmadinejad says, what does the Supreme Leader Khamenei think? To be clear, Khamenei, like Khomeini before him, is staunchly anti-Israeli. When Ahmadinejad called to wipe the “Zionist regime” [not, significantly, the country] off the map, he was restating a long-held position of the Iranian government. Khamenei is also extremely anti-American, though it shouldn’t be forgotten that he condemned the September 11 attacks on the US in no uncertain terms.

The Islamic Republic of Iran would rather Israel as a political entity did not exist. There is no point denying this, and there is no need to. The logical leap made by many commentators is that this equates to a motivation for dropping a nuclear bomb on Tel Aviv. That’s clearly rubbish.

Think through clearly what would happen if Iran, either directly or through Hezbollah, were to bomb Israel. Sure, it would kill lots of Israelis, but it would mean the end of the Islamic Republic. The US and NATO would certainly attack Iran, stopping only when they had toppled the regime.

The Iranian government is fully aware of this, so the question to ask is, why are so many people convinced that the Islamic Republic would wish to commit suicide? Are Western commentators assuming that a government which supports suicide attacks by individuals is prepared to commit suicide itself?

There is no political objective for Iran to achieve by suicidally attacking Israel. No Iranian leader would throw away the Islamic Republic that they have spent three decades constructing in exchange for an Israeli bloodbath.

Khamenei has said that “mass killings of human beings are catastrophic acts which are [to be] condemned, wherever they may happen and whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be”. And he was saying this about an attack on the US, a country every bit as much an enemy of Iran as Israel is. Is this man about to kill millions of Israelis (and Palestinians) in a nuclear attack aimed vaguely at Tel Aviv?

That’s not to say Israelis have nothing to worry about. While they shouldn’t be concerned about a bomb falling on Tel Aviv, they have reason to worry about the increased power that a nuclear Iran would have.

An Iranian bomb would not threaten Israel directly, but it would certainly constrain them from acting without consequence in the region.

“How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”

This is where the paradoxical part comes in – how an Iranian nuclear programme can promote peace. A stronger Iran means stronger allies, and that means Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas – all the parties that Israel has to negotiate with. A nuclear Iran would mean that Israel’s enemies could no longer be ignored, as they are today. Israel’s lack of peace with Lebanon, Syria or the Palestinians is in large part due to Israel feeling it does not need to make the necessary “concessions” in these disputes, and that this stalemate can continue without serious consequences.

A nuclear armed Iran would change that. A relatively weaker Israel will seek security reassurances from elsewhere. When it cannot rely purely on military deterrence, Israel with make what it sees as political concessions.

The evidence is there to see. After this summer’s attacks by Hezbollah on Israel, the Israeli media and government has been making signals about talking to the Syrians. Israel knows that if makes peace with Syria, there will be one less frontier for Iranian influence and threat. Would Israel have been making these moves if Iran was not becoming more powerful? Would Israel be making even more of an effort for peace with these foes if Iran had a nuclear weapon? I think so.

What’s the alternative? Look at the situation today. The core dispute, the Palestinian struggle for independence, has been festering like an open wound for nearly six decades. It has fuelled anti-Semitic and Western hatred around the world. It is a central gripe of Bin Laden’s as stated in his 1996 “declaration of war“. There’s no doubting its importance in inciting militant Islamists to commit acts of violence everywhere.

An Iranian nuclear weapon may instinctively sound like a bad idea, but even the threat of it may encourage Israel to make a meaningful peace with the Palestinians. And that would make all our lives safer.

—

As something of an endnote, I should add that there is one group that could, arguably, suffer as a result of a nuclear Iran. That’s the Iranian people. In much the same way as Kim Jong-il is untouchable; the argument goes that a nuclear bomb would shore-up the authoritarians in Tehran. My personal opinion, which requires a separate entry, is that while clearly not democratic, the political system in Iran is open enough to reform itself – however painstakingly slow the process may appear to be. Genuine political reform has to come from within, and if an Iranian bomb inhibits others from trying to impose rushed “solutions” on the country, then perhaps that’s a good thing.

“These haircuts can get you imprisoned”, Amin boasted. “The authorities forced me to cut my hair before when it was getting too long”, he added. Maybe the regime is not all bad, i thought to myself before getting serious again.

Where the government’s lines can be pushed, they are, and although it may sound trivial to some, haircuts are one of the many frontiers in the social reforms taking place in iran.

‘Bad hejab’, the celebrated sliding-headscarf, is talked about all over the Western media as the ultimate barometer of Iranian social freedoms. However, it really is only one of a dozen areas where people are pushing the boundaries.

Foreign music, raunchy manteaus (!), satellite TV, playing cards (yep, they’re still illegal), booze, illicit dating .. it all goes on, seemingly more intensively because it’s not allowed.

Don’t be fooled by the image propagated by the government that Iranians are all dour pious types. Iranians love to have fun. Ask any Iranian who’s moved to the West and they’ll tell you that you’ve never seen crazier parties than those in Tehran.

Why do Iranians flout the rules so? Because the country is like one big school. There’s a ‘principal’ who sets the rules and lots of lesser ‘teachers’ who enforce the discipline. There are even student ‘prefects’, the ones who get preferential treatment from the teachers for selling out their classmates. There’s even a uniform.

So, it’s not surprising that people want to rebel. And what makes it worse is that this ‘education’ doesn’t seem to be leading anywhere. It’s like being told to be obedient in R.E. (religious education) because it’ll enhance your career prospects. Not likely.

It’s also no coincidence that Pink Floyd is still ridiculously popular in Iran, as Mohammad’s mobile phone will testify. We don’t need no education. Well not religious education, anyway.

Mohammad’s passion for Western music doesn’t stop with Roger Waters. He asked me if I liked the “eegels”. I told him that I didn’t know who they were, but then he started singing Hotel California and I cottoned on.

“Oh, the Eagles“, I replied. “Of course”, I lied, unconvincingly. We moved swiftly on to what music I listened to.

“Erm, have you heard of Jeff Buckley? The Arctic Monkeys?” I suggested, trying to find common ground without sacrificing all taste. Mohammad’s blank look suggested a no but Amin seemed to be searching for some sort of response.

“Espice Girls?” shot-back Amin, with a knowledgeable raise of the (possibly plucked?) eyebrow.

“Not at all. No they’re definitely not cool”, I replied, getting worried.

“Oh, my sister likes them”, justified Amin, “too girly for me”.

“What’s ‘cool’?”, Mohammad asked, still slightly hurt by my evident lack-of-love for the Eagles. Wow, with the all the craving for Western style, I’d have thought that ‘cool’ would have been a word they’d have understood. Surely ‘cool’ was international?

“Umm, it’s when something is really good”, I said, instantly realising that explaining ‘cool’ is not an easy thing to do. Especially not in my less-than-perfect Farsi.

“Err, if you are comfortable doing what you want, that’s cool”, I added.

“So my hair, ‘fashion’, it’s cool?” pleaded Mohammed.

“Definitely”, I said, trying to wrap-up our brief encounter.

**

“Oh, before you go, can you tell me what this says on my t-shirt?”, asked Amin, pointing to a badge above a picture of an eagle on his shoulder [see pic above].

I read it to him: “US Air Force”, before explaining what that meant in Farsi.

“Cool”, Mohammed and Amin agreed, and then headed off home.